History and Intelligence

Successfully Navigating Ethical Asymmetry and Great Power Competition

Much is being made these days of the so-called “return to great power competition,” but as far wiser heads than mine have illustrated, it is not so much a “return” as it is a refocusing – the realization that Western governments, and the United States in particular, have placed disproportionate emphasis on decisive conventional military capability – an “overconfidence” to the point of “strategic narcissism” that prevents American leaders from recognizing that the current strategic paradigm is quickly passing us by. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy acknowledges that great power competition was “dismissed” as a holdover from the previous century. In the meantime, the U.S. has focused almost exclusively on non-state, counterterrorism conflict, ignoring or not fully appreciating the activities of stronger states – certainly a detrimental trend. While the U.S. has become enmeshed in protracted struggles for small victories and acceptable exit strategies, near-peer rivals have been watching, learning, and preparing. Similarly, analogies that seek to pit the United States in a “new Cold War” with either Russia or China – or both – also fall short. To the extent that the Cold War ever was truly ideological, the situation certainly isn’t so now. Indeed, the multi-polar world that is emerging would seem to have more in common with the international order leading up to the First World War than any aspect of the Cold War. Great power rivalry is real, it is happening, and it is being conducted in a realm that combines conventional and unconventional techniques beyond normal American thresholds of operation.[1]

For example – and to play devil’s advocate – speculation surrounding the origins and initial spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has and will continue. Indeed, officials within the U.S. government continue to call for investigations into the origins of the virus. It is not the intention or the place of this paper to doubt intelligence reports or the official positions of the U.S. government in this matter – many more imminently qualified individuals are already engaged in that pursuit. Disinformation is certainly a factor. Instead, this essay seeks to bring nuance to the topic in service of a more complete understanding and an effective strategic outlook regarding potential future crises and American response. Regardless of the true origins of the current pandemic, arguments that seek to explain away fears that COVID-19 might be a biological weapon because, for example, it is not deadly enough, or because many thousands in its country of origin were also infected, run the risk of shortsightedness. We should be politically and intellectually mature enough to consider that this and any future catastrophe – whether it be biological, economic, a cyber attack, or other crisis – might very well have a more sinister underpinning. Economic collapse, for example, not death, could be an intended effect of a biological attack. In such a scenario, high infection rates among the civilian population of the aggressor party would make for an effective, if cruel, cover of plausible deniability. Such a consideration requires recognizing a potential ethical asymmetry between our Western social paradigm and that of our adversaries.[2]

In a post-9/11, post pandemic world it is worth remembering that America’s adversaries often operate in a strategic framework that is beyond the normal, Western liberal democratic standards of logic. At this vantage point, nearly two decades after 9/11 and in a different strategic environment, we should also recognize that these adversaries include state actors whose strategies have evolved past the norms of great power competition that we too often expect – and are more than prepared to counter. Instead, as Australian strategist David Kilcullen points out, these adversaries have begun to behave more like their non-state cousins, emphasizing agility and non-traditional means to achieve strategic objectives – Russia’s recent infiltration and annexation of Crimea as a prime example. It is, perhaps, too easy a trap – a case where our Western mentality, ethical and moral standards limit our ability to anticipate, and therefore counter, non-Western strategic choices. An extreme illustration would be to say that as Western democratic societies we do not send suicide bombers to achieve strategic objectives, we therefore fail to anticipate such as a strategy other state or non-state actors might employ. Thankfully, post the USS Cole attack and 9/11, we are aware of these extreme measures and are prepared to defend against them – but we would do well to consider that this lesson might be effectively applied beyond the world of extremist terrorism. Perhaps communications strategist and best-selling novelist Joel C. Rosenberg said it best – to “misunderstand the nature and threat of evil is to risk being blindsided by it.”[3]

Cyber is an excellent example of what Kilcullen describes as widening the concepts of warfare. John P. Carlin, a former Assistant Attorney General for National Security, observes that the Internet blurs the lines between peace and war, between public and private, nation-state and individual, and between physical and virtual. He argues that the United States has an inadequate vocabulary for describing and framing cyber attacks. Was the 2014 SONY hack a crime or an act of war? How can we tell? What would be an appropriate response? Cyber is just one of the capabilities open to both state and non-state actors in our modern world, yet effectively represents the pervasive ambiguity that is unfortunately becoming more common as the scope and definitions of warfare continue to expand. In this, Kilcullen and Christopher Harmon are likely to agree that, as Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army argue, there is essentially “nothing that cannot be a weapon of war.” Our challenge is to understand and anticipate these threats before it is too late. As Carlin wryly notes, winning the “Code War first requires recognizing that the war has already begun.”[4]

Recognizing American limitations then, how should the United States proceed? What steps should we take? What priorities should we emphasize? I propose the importance of two intertwining disciplines – intelligence and history – in the pursuit of shaping a more complete American strategy for understanding, recognizing, and mobilizing to successfully counter great power competition in the liminal space. Intelligence and history share a natural bond. Both seek to understand that which is not understood, is unexplained, or is unexplored altogether. Both have particular techniques and methodologies that practitioners employ in the pursuit of these answers, and both are likely misunderstood by the general public, to varying degrees. Both should and do inform each other – historians utilize information gathered for intelligence purposes, declassified documents, and other sources to develop deeper understandings of past events. Intelligence professionals should recognize and value the role of history in informing what we know and understand about adversaries and their behavior, thus giving policy-makers a better, clearer lens through which to interpret developing events and navigate the future.

In my own research I focus on the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), a communications intelligence (COMINT) agency created by leaders of the Army Air Forces (AAF) following the Second World War. AAF leaders recognized that COMINT would be crucially important in the postwar environment to come. They also knew, based on prior experience during the war, that relying on information passed down from the U.S. Army or shared from the Navy was not an acceptable solution, and that a separate, independent Air Force COMINT structure would be beneficial. They selected a capable officer to lead the effort, gave him a specialized education in cryptology under the tutelage of none other than Frank Rowlett, and tasked him with building a cryptologic organization that would ultimately be established as a major air command in 1948. But it was not enough to simply possess a separate COMINT structure, dedicated to specific Air Force needs. Soon after the USAFSS was created, Air Force leaders relocated the command from Washington, D.C. to San Antonio, Texas, escaping what they anticipated as centralized external control – which would soon come, first through the Armed Forces Security Agency and then the National Security Agency. The key point here is that, using what they knew about the current environment and drawing on their own past experience, Air Force leaders made plans for the future and took measured steps to prepare for success.[5]

To be sure, the strategic environment and threat landscape that the U.S. military faced in 1948 is markedly than the one it faces today. But leaders then were no less motivated to prevent another Pearl Harbor than American leaders are today regarding 9/11. The difference is that where early Cold War leaders were focused on securing both the hard capabilities and intelligence information necessary to successfully counter a great power rival, the current focus of the United States has been disproportionately occupied by hunting and defeating a variety of increasingly agile and adaptive smaller adversaries – which America’s traditional enemies have learned to emulate. While they have practiced and perfected these techniques – blending conventional and unconventional capabilities, expanding the definitions of warfare, bringing economic and political power to bear on important strategic objectives, and operating in a liminal “gray zone” – the United States has neglected the important task of keeping pace.

Rectifying this situation will first require honest reflection and acknowledgement that America’s current paradigm is no longer sufficient. It will also mean avoiding the sort of “grab bag history” whereby policymakers either consciously choose historical examples selectively in support of a given position, or unconsciously misinterpret or fail to consider certain historical lessons due to a lack of knowledge or understanding. Intelligence also, should keep both the United States’ own past experience and the historical nuances of our potential adversaries in mind. What assumptions do American leaders hold that might be incorrect or lead to misunderstandings of rival intentions, cultures, methods, etc.? Do American government and military leaders frequently operate based on flawed interpretations or an incomplete grasp of historic events and lessons? To the extent that U.S. intelligence, military, and government organizations are aware of liminal activities carried out by Russia or China before, during, or after they occur, are leaders interpreting them correctly and tailoring response options accordingly? Above all – what strategies and capabilities should the United States emphasize in order to effectively counter the new characteristics of great power competition? If COMINT represented a central capability for U.S. military leaders seeking to successfully understand and anticipate Soviet intentions and capabilities during the early Cold War, what is the modern equivalent? Is it cyber, social media, the fusion of cyber and kinetic capabilities, or something else entirely?[6]

Prescriptive answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that history, and intelligence that recognizes and accounts for important historical, cultural, and strategic nuance, are key to both surviving and succeeding in the current strategic environment faced by the United States and the Western world. While such a task certainly sounds almost prohibitively complex, some observations might in fact be deceptively simple – such as the recognition that Russian geopolitical priorities have continued largely unchanged since long before Lenin came to power, and as George Kennan astutely observed in 1946, the Soviet socialist paradigm was merely a “vehicle,” a “guise” through which to pursue traditional objectives, aims that persist to this day. In addition, understanding the potential points of divergence between Western social, ethical, and moral norms and the strategic choices of both state and non-state adversaries – areas of ethical asymmetry – should also be a significant area of emphasis for intelligence professionals and strategists alike. Good intelligence is crucial here, as are strategic imagination, red teaming, and the effective preparation of options based on this insight and a clear understanding of America’s own capabilities. The “return” of great power competition has already taken place. It is now incumbent upon American government, military, and intelligence leaders to recognize the shift and adjust accordingly.[7]

[1] H. R. McMaster, “Developing Strategic Empathy: History as the Foundation of Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy,” The 2020 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History, delivered on 5 January 2020 at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, printed in The Journal of Military History, 84:3 (July 2020), p. 689-697; National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, 27. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Accessed August 18, 2020. David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 17-18, 82-83, 84-112, 223.

[2] U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo with U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, and Australian Defence Minister Linda Reynolds, “Remarks to the Press,” Washington, D.C., July 28, 2020. https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-with-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper-australian-foreign-minister-marise-payne-and-australian-defence-minister-linda-reynolds/ Accessed August 17, 2020. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, “Remarks to the Press,” Washington, D.C., May 20, 2020. https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-6/. Accessed August 17, 2020. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Press Release “Intelligence Community Statement on Origins of COVID-19,” Washington, D.C., April 30, 2020. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2112-intelligence-community-statement-on-origins-of-covid-19. Accessed August 17, 2020. Paul Merklinger and Ryan Orsini, “Disinformation Disruption and Distance: Public Confidence in the U.S. Military in the COVID-19 Era,” The Strategy Bridge (July 28, 2020), https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/7/28/disinformation-disruption-and-distance-public-confidence-in-the-us-military-in-the-covid-19-era. Ample coverage regarding the ethics of asymmetric warfare can be found in the literature. The usage of “ethical asymmetry” here refers to a divergence in what activities are acceptable or allowable by social, legal, or ethical standards and norms – as described by Lee Grubbs, Director of the Mad Scientist Initiative at the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, when discussing future threats and the evolution of warfare. See Lee Grubbs, (The Mad Scientists: A Conversation with Lee Grubbs), interview with Dr. Vince Houghton, Spycast, The International Spy Museum, podcast audio, April 10, 2018, https://www.spymuseum.org/multimedia/spycast/episode/the-mad-scientists-a-conversation-with-lee-grubbs/.  

[3] Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes, 1-24; Joel C. Rosenberg, Epicenter: Why the Current Rumblings in the Middle East Will Change Your Future (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2008), 47.

[4] Kilcullen, 6; John P. Carlin, The Dawn of the Code War: America’s Battle Against Russia, China, and the Rising Global Cyber Threat (New York: PublicAffairs, 2018), 57-61, 334-335, 403; Christopher C. Harmon, “Innovation and Historical Continuity in Great Power Competition.” Marine Corps University Journal, 10:2 (Fall 2019), 19.

[5] Philip C. Shackelford, “Fighting for Air: The Struggle for Air Force COMINT, 1945-1952.” U.S. Military History Review, 5:1 (December 2018).

[6] Arne Kislenko, “The Primacy of History” (TEDx talk, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, April 4, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSKpVMAlt8E.

[7] “George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’,” February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246; reprinted in US Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 696-709. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178. Accessed August 8, 2020.